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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the individuaJ-Jevel determinants of public support 
for European enlargement. Previous research on European public attitudes 
mainly concentrates on public support for the integration process and offers a 
variety of explanations. In the CUITent literature, three prominent theoretieal 
explanations of public support highlight the role of economie/rational 
ca1culations, domestie poli tics and national identity as the main determinants of 
public attitudes toward integration. In this study, we first test the validity of these 
propositions within the context of support for European enlargement. 
Additional1y, we suggest that public support for enlargement is influenced by an 
individual's prefeITed adaptation strategies for minority groups. Simply put, we 
argue that the views of the members of the majority groups in terms of the 
integration of "others", either multieultural or assimilationist, are important 
predictors of public support for enlargement. In order to test these propositions, 
we develop a series of logistic regression models of public support for the 
membership of Turkey and Poland, using data from a Eurobarometer survey 
(2000) conducted in 15 member states. The results show strong support for 
national identity hypotheses. AIso, we find that democratic system satisfaction 
and positive economic evaluations increase the likelihood of support for the 
accession of Turkey and Poland. The findings reveal that education levels, 
income levels and occupational skills do not have a consistent effect on attitudes 
toward enlargement. Finally, the results confirm our hypotheses. While 
respondents with multicultural attitudes toward "others" are more supportive for 
the accession in both cases, respondents with assimilationist expectations are less 
enthusiastic about the membership of Turkey and Poland. 
Keywords: public support, European enlargement, European integration, 
national identity, economic calculations, symbolic threat, realistic 
threat, multiculturalism, assimilationist expectations 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette étude examine les déterminants de l'opinion publique sur 
l'élargissement de l'Union européenne. La recherche sur l'opinion publique 
européenne se concentre particulièrement sur les attitudes envers l'intégration 
européenne. Ces études soulignent le rôle des calculs économiques/rationnels, de 
la politique domestique et de l'identité nationale comme les déterminants 
principaux des attitudes du public à l'égard de l'intégration. Dans ce memoire, 
nous évaluons d'abord la validité de ces propositions dans le contexte du soutien 
à l'élargissement européen. De plus, nous estimons que l'appui du public à 
l'élargissement est influencé par les préférences individuelles au sujet des 
stratégies d'adaptation des minorités. Nous soutenons que les comportements des 
membres des groupes majoritaires en ce qui concerne l'intégration des « autres », 
qu'ils soient multiculturels ou assimilationistes, sont des indicateurs importants 
de l'appui du public à l'élargissement. Pour évaluer ces propositions, nous 
développons une série de modèles de régression logistique de l'appui du public 
pour l'adhésion de la Turquie et la Pologne, utilisant des données d'un sondage 
Eurobaromètre (2000) mené dans 15 états membres. Les résultats montrent un 
puissant support pour les hypothèses d'identité nationale. Aussi, nous constatons 
que la satisfaction envers le système démocratique et des évaluations 
économiques positiv!;!s augmentent la probabilité de l'appui à l'accession de la 
Turquie et de la Pologne. Les résultats révèlent que le niveau d'éducation, le 
revenu et les compétences professionnelles n'ont pas d'effet cohérent sur les 
attitudes envers l'élargissement. Finalement, les résultats confirment nos 
hypothèses. Tandis que les individus avec des attitudes multiculturelles envers 
les «autres» sont plus favorables pour l'accession dans les deux cas, les 
répondants avec des attentes assimilationistes sont moins enthousiastes à propos 
de l'adhésion de la Turquie et la Pologne. 
Mot-Clef: opinion publique, élargissement de l'UE, intégration européenne, 
identité nationale, calculs économiques, menace symbolique, menace 
réaliste, multiculturalisme, attentes assimilationistes 
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Introduction 
On October 3, 2005, the opening of negotiation talks between the EU and 
Turkey, which has been an associate member of the Community since 1963 and 
an official candidate since 1999, marked an historical step toward the integration 
of both parties. However, during the meetings, there were harsh discussions 
among the leaders of the member states concerning the future membership of 
Turkey. Austria explicitly opposed Turkey's full membership and insisted on the 
addition of the alternative prospects to the negotiations excIuding full 
membership. During the discussions, a statement made by Ursula Plassnik, 
Austria's Foreign Minister, was remarkabIe. According to the Foreign Minister, 
her country was "Iistening to the people" by questioning the full membership for 
Turkey (BBC News 4/1 ]/2005). Indeed, a recent survey on further EU 
enlargement indicates that more than half of all European citizens are against the 
membership of Turkey (Eurobarometer 63: 154). 
It is commonly argued that European integration is an elite-driven 
process. In the early periods of integrative efforts, the role of public opinion in 
the integration process was neglected in practice as weIl as in academic research. 
However, from the mid 1980s, during the years of transition from an economic 
community toward a political union, the political elites introduced new actions to 
increase the participation of the masses in European affairs. AdditionaIly, with 
the increasing salience of European policies, the public has been more reactive 
toward EU politics and has shown more opposition through referendums, 
national and supranational elections, and interest groups. 
A growing literature examines public support for European integration. In 
one of the first attempts to explain public attitudes toward integration, Inglehart 
(l970a) underlines the effects of cognitive mobilization on public support. The 
cognitive mobilization theory indicates that strong political communication skills 
and high politieal awareness tend to favor the support for integration policies by 
making the EU institutions more familiar and less threatening. In the subsequent 
periods, the increasing interests of scholars resulted in additional research on the 
issue and a variety of approaches to understanding public opinion on integration. 
These approaches can be classified under three main categories. The first 
category is composed of economie/rational calculation explanations which 
contend that, depending on socioeconomie status, the European integration 
process (or to be strictly accurate, the liberalization of the EU market) creates 
different costs and benefits in citizens' lives which affect their attitudes toward 
European integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel ] 998a, 1998b, 1998c, 
Anderson and Reiehert 1996). These studies bring out education levels, 
occupational skills and income levels as the main determinants of public support. 
Another line of argumentation indieates that the perceptions of the economie 
situation and positive economic self-evaluations are intluential on the formation 
of attitudes toward integration (Gabel 1997, Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). The 
second category of theoretical perspectives consists of studies which examine the 
roIe of domestic political factors. This approach stresses the impact of domestic 
political dynamics on mass attitudes. In this perspective, it has been argued that 
individuals rely on cues from domestic politics with which they are more 
familiar; for instance the performance of national governments can affect their 
attitudes toward EU integration (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994, Franklin, 
Van der Eijk and Marsh 1995, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Ray 2003a). 
Similarly, Anderson concentrates on the raie of domestic politics and offers the 
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notion that people use domestic political proxles such as system and 
establishment party support to evaluate European integration (Anderson 1998, 
Kritzenger 2003). Finally, the third category of approach highlights the role of 
feelings toward national identity. The main argument in this category is that 
European unification diminishes national power over economic and political 
issues, which gives rise to opposition from individuals with a strong national 
identity and attachment (Carey 2002, Taggart 1998, Hooghe and Marks 2004). 
Furthermore, it has been disputed that the weakening influences of nation-states 
over European issues increase the level of concern over the integrity of the 
nation (De Master and Le Roy 2000) and the level of perceived threat on cultural 
and economic resources (Mclaren 2002, 2006, de V reese and Boomgaarden 
2005), which has a negative effect on the leveJ of support for Integration. These 
different approaches that explain the determinants of public support for 
integration will be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
Despite the growing literature on public support for Integration, studies 
that focus on public attitudes toward enlargement have been mostly neglected. 
The literature on European enlargement mostly concentrates on the economic, 
social, political and institutional implications of the accession for candidate and 
member states. Political and economic reforms taking place in the candidate 
states as weil as the democracy promotion effect of the EU are among the highly 
discussed issues. Concerning the public support for enlargement, there are 
studies which examine public attitudes in candidate states (Grabbe and Hughes 
1999, Ehin 2001). However, there are only a few studies that concentrate on the 
public views about enlargement in member states. These studies emphasize the 
role of the transaction between countries, geographic proximity (Jones and Van 
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der Bijl 2005), democracy promotion (Hazama 2007), and anti-immigration 
sentiments (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005) as the main predictors of the 
support or opposition for enlargement. Nevertheless, none of these studies have 
observed the effects of explanations offered in the integration literature on 
enlargement. This study's objective is to fill the gap in that area. 
In this study, we also propose a novel explanation. We argue that the 
position taken by the majority group members on the incorporation of different 
ethnie and cultural groups plays a crucial role in the formation of their attitudes. 
The studies conducted on intercultural relations show that in a society the 
majority and minority groups might have different preferences about the 
adaptation strategies to the host society (Van Oundenhoven, Prins and Buunk 
1998, Van Oundenhoven and Eisses 1998, Horenczyck 1996). While sorne 
members of majority groups are in favor of multiculturalism as the adaptation 
strategy, sorne display assimilationist expectations. In this study, we argue that 
their views on that subject are essential parts of their attitudes toward the EU 
membership of new countries. In other words, we suggest that the views of the 
members of the majority groups in terms of the integration of "others," either 
multicultural or assimilationist, are an important determinant of public opinion 
on the enlargement process. In this context, this research seeks to contribute to 
the literature on the one hand by analyzing individual level determinants of 
public attitudes proposed in the European integration literature within the context 
of enlargement. On the other hand, we examine the effects of assimilationist 
expectations and multicultural approaches on support for the enlargement 
process. 
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In the study, the focus will essentially be on the Turkish case; although, it 
will be conducted by comparing Turkey and Poland in order to better understand 
and interpret the determinants of public opinion. Using Eurobarometer surveys 
conducted in member states in 2000, we realized logistic regression analyses to 
test the alternative theories of public support for enlargement. We believe that in 
the case of Turkey's accession, the attitudes of the European citizens should be 
explored in detail for two main reasons. First, the integration of Turkey into the 
European structure, with its 70 million Muslims, cultural differences and 
economic weaknesses, is one of the major challenges of European integration. 
Second, sorne countries such as France and Austria declared that the membership 
of Turkey will be presented in referendums at the end of the negotiation talks. In 
other words, the final decision on the accession will be given by the European 
public. Consequently, mass attitudes toward enlargement should be taken into 
serious consideration. 
This study consists of two parts. In the first chapter, we discuss briefly 
the increasing role of public attitudes in the European integration process, and 
the channels of popular influence in the policy-making process. In this chapter, 
we also analyze in detail the main theories which try to explain the fundamental 
determinants of public support for the European integration process. In the 
second part of the study, we demonstrate the statistical relationships between 
public attitudes toward Turkey's and Poland's accession to the EU and test the 
major hypotheses put forward in the literature that examine public support for 
European integration. 
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Chapter 1- European Public Opinion 
In this first chapter, we try to answer two important questions. The first 
question is "Why study public attitudes toward European integration?". In order 
to provide a consistent answer to that question, we discuss in the first section of 
the chapter the place of public opinion in the early phases of European 
integration, and the increasing significance of public opinion in European 
poli tics. The second question that we attempt to answer is "What are the main 
determinants of public attitudes toward European affairs?" For that aspect, we 
will review the research conducted to understand the basics of public attitudes 
toward European integration as well as toward European enlargement. 
A- The end of "permissive consensus" 
European integration has often been referred to as an elite-driven process. 
During the early periods of the integration movement, the role of mass attitudes 
on the integration process has been mostly neglected. As the community has 
been perceived as an international economic organization, the emphasis has been 
put mainly on the efficiency of the institutions (Majone 2000, 1994, Dahl 1994), 
and on the role of elites and intergovernmental cooperation (Moravcsik 1991, 
Follesdal and Hix 2005). In his seminal work, Haas maintains that "it is as 
impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion 
surveys or ev en to surveys of specifically interested groups" (Haas 1958: 17). 
According to Haas, "it suffi ces to single out and define the political elites in the 
participating countries, to study their reactions to integration and to assess 
changes in attitude on their part" (ibid). This period has been characterized by a 
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"permissive consensus," a notion introduced by Lindberg and Scheingold, 
between masses and elites which allowed political elites to take necessary steps 
in the integration project without public pressure (Anderson 2005: 5). During 
this period, as the union has been perceived as an international economic 
organization, citizens had very little interest in politics on the European sphere; 
they either "had no opinion about the actions pursued by their governments or 
they supported their governments actions toward further integration" (Hix 2005: 
149). In this perspective, during the early phases of the integration process, it 
may be accurate to describe public opinion as irrelevant to the process which 
paved the way for the discussions concerning the legitimacy of the EU and the 
de'mocratic deficit. Democratic deficit can be simpJy defined as the "Jack of 
popular control over the institutions of European Union" (Gibson and Caldeira 
1998: 69) and, according to Geddes, the strong power of national ministers, 
European officiaIs and technocrats on EU level decision-making pose a threat to 
the EU's democratic accountability (Geddes, 2000: 4). 
In this perspective, can we assume that public opinion was insignificant 
in the European integration process? Public opinion is a dynamic phenomenon 
which involves variation over time (Anderson 2005: 2). It is commonly accepted 
that, beginning in the mid 1980s, public preferences gained a more significant 
role in the integration progress. The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986, 
which aimed to eliminate aIl the direct and indirect trade barri ers between 
member states, was an important step in creating a single European market. In 
the following period, the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 has 
been a crucial step toward the creation of the political union (Franklin, Marsh 
and McLaren 1994: 455). One of the main objectives of the Maastricht Treaty, as 
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stated in the first article of the treaty, was to establish "an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible 
to the citizen" (1992). It should be emphasized that both the SEA and the 
Maastricht treaty were leading up to a stronger influential role for the public in 
the Integration process. However, during this period, the Danish rejection of the 
treaty in a referendum in June 1992 and the French approval of the treaty with a 
tiny margin became a surprising indicator of the increasing popular opposition 
among the European public (Franklin et al. 1994: 456). As the European Union 
has become more salient in citizens' lives on the way toward political union, 
there has been increasing public involvement into the Integration process 
(Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 507), which has brought the end of "permissive 
consensus." As argued by Anderson, the reaction shown during the referendums 
of the Maastricht treaty has indicated that "the European masses have the ability 
and willingness to constrain and possibly forestall further progress toward a 
unified Europe" (Anderson 1998: 570). Simply put, the opposition of the masses 
during the referendums made clear to the European eIites that public opinion 
should be more seriously taken into consideration in the European project. 
In the same manner, the recent French and Dutch rejections of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty du ring the 2005 referendums became another important 
example of how public opinion affects the Integration process 1 and highlighted 
the referendums as an important channel of popular influence in the European 
policy-making process. Yet, it should be noted that the channels of popular 
influence on integrative policies are not limited to the referendums. The national 
elections are also important instruments of public influence on European poli tics. 
l For details on the referendums, see Whitman 2005. 
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No doubt, the relationship between decision makers and the "voters" is different 
in the EU th an in a typical representative democracy (Gabel and Anderson 2004: 
13). However, the national ministers in the Council of Ministers who make 
decisions concerning the EU policies and the national parliaments that ratify 
these decisions are responsible to their citizens (Gabel 1998a: 5). The positive or 
negative evaluations of the policies at the EU level would affect the choices of 
voters in national elections (De Vreese 2004: 2-3), which in tum convince the 
political elites to take into account public preferences in the policy-making 
process. 
Besides the referendums and national elections, another important 
channel of public influence in the EU sphere is the European ParIiament (EUP). 
The first direct elections for the European parliament took place in 1979, but in 
the early phases of the integration process, the European Parliament had Iimited 
power on EU policy-making. The first important change in the power of the EUP 
appeared with the coming into force of the cooperation procedure established by 
the SEA. According to this procedure, if the Parliament takes a position for a 
proposaI forwarded by the Commission, the Council of Ministers could amend 
the position taken by the Parliament by a unanimous vote. Simply put, with the 
implementation of the cooperation procedure, for the council of ministers, the 
acceptance of a Parliament proposaI supported by the commission was easier 
than modifying it. This power has been called a "conditional agenda setter" 
(Tsebelis 1994: 128, 1996 see also Moser 1996). In the following period, the co-
decision procedure introduced by the Maastricht treaty and reformed later by the 
Amsterdam and Nice treaties, has been an important step in increasing the 
legislative power of the European Parliament. With the new procedure, EUP had 
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the power to prevent the implementation of new policies by rejecting a proposaI 
in the economic and social issues where the co-decision procedure applies. 
According to Tsebelis et al., during this period, the European Parliament 
"evolved from an almost insignificant and purely consultative assembly to a 
potentially powerful player in the legislative process with significant 
independent powers and resources" (Tsebelis, Jensen, Kalandrakis and Kreppel 
2001: 573). 
The improvement of the legislative powers of the European parliament is 
crucial for an increase in public participation and to make public attitudes a 
determinant of the integration process (Gabel 1998a: 6). Early studies on the 
European Parliament and the voting behavior in elections contend that the EUP 
elections have the characteristics of the "second order elections" (Reif 1984, Reif 
and Schmitt 1980, Marsh and Franklin 1996, see also Marsh 1998). In 
comparison to the first order elections, which are national parliamentary or 
presidential elections, the second order elections are perceived as less important 
as "there is less at stake" (Reif and Schmitt 1980: 8). Local, regional, and 
provincial elections, as weil as European Parliament elections, can be considered 
in this category. The second order characteristic of EUP elections has 
implications on the level of participation as weil as in the representation of 
interests in the Parliament. This characteristic, on the one hand, results in a lower 
turnout level in the elections (Reif 1984, Reif and Schmitt 1980, Marsh 1998, 
Schmitt 2005) and, on the other hand, paves the way for the reflection of national 
partisan concerns instead of the supranational political issues (Gabel 1998a: 6). 
However, an increase in the power of influence and a role in the policy-making 
process are critical for the public support of the EU Parliament (Rohrschneider 
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2002: 463-464) as weIl as for the higher level of participation of the European 
parliamentarian in the EU related policy-making process (Scull y 1997: 245). 
Although the level of turnout in the election is not quite as high as expected 
(Schmitt 2(05), the increasing role of the Parliament in the 1egislation makes the 
EUP an important channel of public influence on integration through their 
representatives in the Parliament. 
In the early periods of the European integration process, public opinion 
was mostly underestimated. On the road of transition from an international 
economic organization toward a political union, the significance of public 
opinion and preferences gained substantiaJ salience. Today, referendums. 
national elections, European Parliament as weil as interest groups (Aspinwall 
1998) and the European Court of Justice (Alter 2(00) are the main channels of 
public influence. As stated by Anderson, the progress in the European integration 
process shows that "European integration, originally pu shed forward at the elite 
level, cannot progress without public support" (2005: 6). Up until now, we have 
tried to point to the increasing role of public opinion in the integration process 
and to the main channels of public participation and influences. In the fol1owing 
section, we will present the main theories proposed in the Iiterature which 
examines the determinants of public opinion toward integration. 
1 1 
B- Understanding European public opinion 
Before concentrating on the explanations and arguments put forward to 
explain public attitudes toward Integration, an important point should be noted. 
In the public opinion literature, there is a variety of approaches which differ in 
the level of analysis. While sorne studies focus on individual level measures, 
others conduct their research by using national level analysis. In the literature, 
national level analyses mainly put forward national economic performance of the 
member states as the main determinant of variation in public opinion. However, 
individual level analysis takes into consideration the socioeconomic, ideological 
as weIl as cultural factors as the determinants of public opinion on European 
integration. Even though we will also discuss in this study the explanations on 
the national level, we will mainly concentrate on the explanations on the 
individuallevel. 
In the literature, scholars offered a variety of explanations for 
understanding public opinion toward Integration. One of the early and most 
influential propositions in the literature has been developed by Roland Inglehart. 
In his cognitive mobilization theory, he argues that people with high cognitive 
mobilization tend to be more supportive toward European institutions and 
consequently, toward European Integration (Inglehart 1970a). According to this 
perspective, the cognitive mobilization is characterized by strong skills in 
political communication and high levels of political awareness (Gabel 1998a: 95, 
Gabel ] 998b: 335). These factors make the European institutions more familiar 
and therefore less threatening, which leads to an increase in support (Inglehart 
1970a: 47, Inglehart 1977: 338). According to the author, cognitive mobilization 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition of support for European Integration, 
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but he also asserts that political awareness does not necessarily result in a 
favorable opinion toward European institutions and integrative policies. 
However, he claims that "for those with a high Ievel of political awareness and 
skills in political communication, there is at least good chance that one will come 
to identify with a supranational political community" (ibid 1977: 338). 
In another study, Inglehart points to the role of value orientation in 
explaining public attitudes toward European integration (Inglehart 1970b, 1977, 
for a detailed analysis see Janssen 1991). Inglehart argues that the political 
orientations of individuals are formed during early life, and proposes that the 
socioeconomic environment of these years is influential in their political 
attitudes (1970b: 767-768). In Europe, since the end ofWorld War II, there have 
been significant changes in the socioeconomic sUIToundings as weIl as in the 
value orientations of generations (1970b: 768, Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991). 
Young generations growing up during the strong economic development era 
have different value orientations than the generations that grew up during the 
high scarcity days of WWII. Inglehart distinguishes two value orientations: 
materialist and post-materialist. Individuals with materialist orientations 
prioritize the economic and physical security, while individuals with post-
materialist orientations prioritize the intellectual needs, need for belonging, and 
need for independence and self-actualization (Janssen 1991: 445). In this 
framework, the main argument in the value orientation theory is that, post-
materialists have more favorable attitudes toward European integration than 
materialists because, on the one hand, post-materialists are less preoccupied with 
the economic and safety needs, which facilitates the emergence of a 
cosmopolitan political identity (lnglehart 1977: 334) and, on the other hand, as 
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the EU enforces the reforms toward less nationalistic and more egalitarian 
society, it is more attractive for the individuals with post-materialist values 
(Gabel 1998a: 97). 
Both cognitive mobilization and value orientations theories have been 
cited in various studies. However, recent studies show that both theories have 
Iimited explanatory power for public attitudes toward European integration. 
Janssen, in his study, tested both theories and found that although individuals 
with high poli tic al skills and awareness understand the European institution 
better and are more supportive of integration, the change in value orientations 
provides no impact on public attitudes toward integration (1991). Similarly, in 
the studies conducted by Gabel (1998a, ] 998b) which analyze public support for 
European integration in member states, both theories are not supported by the 
data. In another analysis, Anderson and Reichert found that materialists in the 
new member states are more supportive than post-materialists, which is exactly 
the opposite of the main value orientation argument (Anderson and Reichert 
1995: 246). 
Starting from the beginning of the 1990s, an increasing number of 
researches have been conducted by scholars in the domain of public support for 
integration, and various approaches have been proposed in the literature. These 
approaches can be categorized under three main strands, which constitute the 
base of our research: economic/rational calculations, domestic politics, and 
national identity. 
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a-) Economiclrational calculations: 
In the literature on public opinion on European integration, the studies 
stressing the role of economic factors are at the center. Considering the main 
thrust of European integration which paved the way for the elimination of 
barri ers against free movement of good, capital and labor and for the creation of 
the Monetary Union, the majority of the studies which explain variation in public 
opinion by economic calculations is not unexpected (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 
415). In the rational calculations strand, the anal ysis has been conducted both at 
the nationallevel and the individuallevel. 
In the national level or aggregate level explanations, Eichenberg and 
Dalton (1993) examine the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and 
aggregate level support for EU integration. According to the authors, "if the EC 
has promised anything, it has promised the enhancement of member states' 
national economic welfare" (Eichenberg1993: 510). In this perspective, they 
examine the national economic performance and the relative economic position 
within the EU to understand the variation in the level of support for European 
integration (Brinegar and Jolly 2005: 156). Following the work of Lewis-Beck 
(1988) on economic voting which stresses the relationship between economic 
conditions and evaluation of the national govemment, Eichenberg and Dalton 
focus on inflation rates, unemployment rates and gross domestic product (GDP) 
to determine their influences on public opinion (1993: 512), based on data 
spanning from 1973 to 1988. They maintain that these three variables consist of 
"the essential, cross nationally comparable elements of the economy that are the 
basis for the public evaluations" (1993:513). According to the authors, GDP is 
the essential indicator of overall living standard in a country, in other words it is 
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one of the key measures of economic well-being. In addition, the inflation rates 
and unemployment rates provide strong signs about the economic stress (ibid). 
As stated earlier, Eichenberg and Dalton emphasize the role of economic 
performance in public evaluations and in this context, they expect that increase 
in GDP would have positive effect on public support while higher levels of 
inflation and unemployment rate would result by decreasing public support 
toward European integration. The result of their analysis put forward strong 
support for the effect of inflation rates on public opinion while GDP and 
unemployment rates show weaker support. In another study which is testing the 
findings of the Eichenberg and Dalton's analysis using data from 1973 to 1993, 
Anderson and Kalthenhaler find that GDP, unemployment rates and inflation 
have significant effects on integration support (1996). 
Another argument proposed at the national level emphasizes the effect of 
the losses and benefits received from the union membership on public attitudes 
toward membership (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Anderson and Reichert 1996). 
Anderson and Reichert point out two kinds of benefits from EU membership: 
direct benefils constitute the funds received from the EU budget, while indirect 
benefils refer to the increasing amount of trade with other member states and 
sorne other opportunities such as professional mobility (1996: 233). Simply put, 
it has been suggested that a higher level of retums from the EU budget as weil as 
an increasing amount of positive trade balance with other member states leads to 
the higher level of citizen support toward the integration process. 
A recent approach that focuses on the effects of costlbenefit calculations 
on public attitudes emphasizes the influence of political-economic institutions 
(Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004). According to the authors, "the mechanism 
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linking institutions and citizens' assessment of EU integration is the perception 
of costs and benefits accruing from integration in light of domestic capitalist 
institutions" (2004: 64). One of the propositions in the study underlines the role 
of wage-bargaining regimes on the socio-tropic calculations of cost and benefits 
of EU integration. Brinegar et al. argue that centra1ized wage bargaining 
provides mechanisms to keep the macroeconomic stability in terms of low 
.inflation, low unemployment and high growth (ibid). According to the authors, 
the median national voter prioritizes the col1ective good of the country. They 
reason that the opposition to integrative policy may be more powerful in the 
countries with coordinated wage bargaining regimes than fragmented bargaining 
systems (ibid: 65). The study also stresses the types of welfare states. Referring 
to Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), Brinegar et al. distinguish three types of 
welfare states: Iiberal, conservative-Christian and social-democratic welfare 
states. Two main ideas in the argumentation are that, first, median voters 
calculate the costs and benefitsof the integration by comparing their social 
policy practices with predominant European states' - especially with France and 
Germany- social policy practices and, second, median voters favor the status quo 
in their country as they see the change from existing social policy to another as a 
big cost imposed on them (ibid: 67). Given that conservative-Christian model of 
welfare state is more widespread among EU members (ibid), the authors argue 
that citizens from conservative welfare states will be more favorable of 
integration process. On the contrary, citizens in Iiberal arid social-democratic 
welfare states should be more skeptical about the integration process compared 
to those in conservative welfare states as they may confront high national 
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adjustment costs as a resuIt of conforming with European social policy norms 
(ibid: 67-68, see also Hooghe 2004). 
The individual level hypothesis examining the effects of economicl 
rational calculations on public attitudes toward European integration has been 
introduced by Gabel and Palmer (1995). The main argument is that "the 
economic consequences of the European integration differentially influence 
citizen's welfare depending on their economic and political interests" (Gabel 
1998a: 100) which, in tum, influence citizens' attitudes toward the integration 
process. In other words, in this line of explanation, it has been argued that the 
liberalization of the European Union market has different costs and benefits for 
citizens from different socioeconomic statuses which shape their attitudes toward 
integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, Anderson and 
Reichert 1996). According to Gabel, the education level, occupational skills and 
income levels are primary factors in the public support for European integration. 
Regarding the education level and occupational skills, Gabel argues that 
in the advanced industrial economies of Europe, a high level of education and 
experience in skilled occupations-in other words, a high level of "hum an 
capital"-are more valuable and transferable (Gabel 1998:43, 1995:7). Given the 
EU-wide competition for jobs, which allows companies to hire workers from 
different member countries, high levels of education and occupational skills may 
provide a more advantageous environment for employment. In opposition, for 
less educated individuals and unskilled workers, the employment opportunities 
are more pessimistic because as the labor suppl y has spread to the entire 
European union, labor supply differences between states will decrease, which 
affects wages (1998a: 61). Also, the free movement of capital and labor will 
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foster the flowing of capital to cheaper labor by making it "Iess costly for capital 
to move rather than accede to labor demands" (Gabel 1998b: 337, see also 
1998c). In this perspective, Gabel claims that high education and strong 
occupational skills are positively related to costfbenefit calculations, which are 
consequently related to the support for integration. 
Concerning in corne level, Gabel posits that the level of income is an 
important factor in their co st benefit evaluations and consequently in their 
attitudes toward integration (Gabel 1998a, 1995, Anderson and Reichert 1996). 
The main proposition is that the liberalization of capital markets and the creation 
of the economic and monetary union will create costs for the low income citizens 
while high incorne citizens will benefit from it (Gabel 1998a: 46). The low-
inflation and new investment opportunities resulting from the market 
liberalization and EMU increase the support of the high income citizens. On the 
contrary, the low income citizens who are more dependent on the social welfare 
programs are more Iikely to oppose the European integration process (Gabel 97: 
7, Gabel 1998a: 46). In surn, this perspective underlines the roles of incorne, 
education and occupational skills as the main determinants of public attitudes 
toward integration. 
Proposition la: Lower Ievels of socioeconomic status are related to 
lower support for EU integration. 
Another line of argumentation on the determinants of individual level 
support for EU integration takes into consideration the role of perceptions of 
economic conditions. As stated earlier, Eichenberg and Dalton investigated the 
role of evaluations of the economic losses and benefits on public attitudes toward 
integration (1993). Similarly, Gabel and Whitten also give weight to the roIe of 
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economic perceptions in understanding public opinion about the integration; 
however, they differ in the level of analysis (1997). According to the authors, 
instead of aggregate level analysis, the relationship between economic 
evaluations and public attitudes should be investigated at the individual level 
because "objective measures of national economy may be poor proxies for 
citizens' economic sensitivities" (1997: 82). They ground their views first to the 
insufficiency of objective national conditions to reflect the sub-national 
economic variations and second to the inconsistency between objective 
economic conditions and individual's economic perceptions (ibid). 
Proposition lb: Positive evaluations of economic conditions are related 
to higher support for EU integration. 
As the studies in the rational calculation strand assume that citizens are 
economically rational, have high levels of awareness of European issues and 
have the capability to make rational calculations about the co st and benefits of 
the integration process, it has been subject to strong critics (Anderson 1998, see 
also, McLaren 2006). Still, it can be said that this model of explanations is 
commonly referred to in the literature on public opinion toward integration. 
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b-) Domestie polities: 
ln this set of explanations, the studies highlight the roIe of domestic 
politics and national cues on the formation of public attitudes toward European 
integration. The main argument is that considering citizens' low levels of 
knowledge on the integration issues, when determining their attitudes toward 
European politics with which the y are less familiar, they use information from 
the national govemment and domestic cu es which they know weIl (McLaren 
2002: 553). In this section, we will try to discuss in detail the main approaches of 
this perspective. 
In a study conducted by Franklin et al., the authors investigate the main 
reasons for the "surprising" results of the 1992 EC referendums which resulted 
in the Danish rejection and the French approval with a tiny margin (Franklin, 
Marsh and McLaren 1994). Analyzing the voting behaviors of the citizens from 
Denmark, France and Ireland during the Maastricht referendums, the authors 
claim that the main factor in the Danish refusaI was the unpopularity of the 
govemment and the behaviors of political parties, rather than their views about 
the integration policies (Franklin et al. 1994, Franklin, Van der Eijk and Marsh 
1995, Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Consistent with Reif and Schmitts' 
views about the categorization of the European elections as second order 
elections mentioned earlier, the authors reason that the European elections are 
"treated as opportunities to discuss national political differences and to register 
support for, or opposition to, political parties on the basis of these differences" 
(Van der Eijk and Franklin] 996: 367). On issues conceming European politics, 
the national parties refrain from mobilizing their supporters against or in favor of 
the issues and leave the responsibility to govemment. Consequently, the 
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performance of the govemment becomes crucial (Franklin et al. 1994: 470). 
Besides, the incumbent govemment plays a very significant role on voters' 
behavior because it has an institutional advantage as the agenda-setter and can 
manipulate the voters with limited information (Schneider and Weitsman 1996: 
586). The low salience of European issues and the limited knowledge of the 
masses in terms of European polities, according to Franklin et al, "attempts to 
consult the voters about European matters being essentially hijacked for partisan 
and national ends .. .In country after country, European elections are fought not 
on European but national issues" (Franklin et al.1994: 469-70). 
A study conducted by Ray gives support to this perspective and 
highlights the relationship between the support for the incumbent government 
and the level of support for European integration (Ray 2003a). However, he 
points to a very important distinction: in terms of the referendum or European 
elections, he finds a positive relationship between incumbent support and 
attitudes toward European policies, but adds that on general support for 
European integration or on support for EU membership, this relationship 
diminishes (ibid). Hug and Sciarini, in their detailed study whieh examines 14 
referendums held on European integration since the 1970s, highlight the role of 
partisanship and argue that the effect of the incumbent government on attitudes 
depends on the intentions and signaIs sent to the voters by the govemment. 
According to the authors, if the government reflects the referendum as a "vote of 
confidence", it leads to stronger support for the govemment's position (2000, see 
also Ray 2003b). In other words, the reaction of the public depends on the 
context in which the situation has been presented. 
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Proposition 2a: Positive evaluations of the incumbent govemment are 
related to higher support for EU integration. 
No doubt, this strand of explanation generated many critics. For instance, 
Siune et al. reject the role of political parties and performance of govemment as 
the main and only factor. They also see the European elections and referendums 
as a mechanism used by the public to support or to punish their govemment 
parties and domestic parties and indicate that the Danish refusai of the 
Maastricht treaty was a result of public views on European issues (Siune and 
Svensson 1993, Siune, Svensson and Tonsgaard 1994). Similarly, Garry et al., 
analyzing the Nice referendum c1aim that the satisfaction with the incumbent 
govemment played a Iimited role on public attitudes. According to the authors, 
in the Nice treaty referendum, the response to the key issue-European 
en)argement- was the main determinant of public attitudes (Garry, Marsh and 
Sinnott 2005: 215). 
In another study which focuses on the role of domestic factors, Anderson 
first criticizes the proposition that the economic rational explanations play an 
essential role on attitudes formation toward integration, given the low level of 
information on European issues and on the effects of European integration, and 
daims that economic calculations have an indirect role (Anderson 1998: 573). 
According to Anderson, the lack of information on European matters pushes 
citizens to refer to proxies in evaluating integration and these proxies are based 
on perceptions of domestic politics (Anderson 1998): 
Because citizens lack crucial information about the integration process, they 
resort to proxies derived from domestic political reality to comprehend and form 
opinions about il. This does not mean that opinions about Europe are irrational or lack 
coherence. Instead of seeking out information about the minutiae of the EU when they 
have more pressing demands on their lime, citizens view the integration process through 
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the Jens of how they feeJ about their own political system, poJiticaJ parties and to a 
lesser extent, their government (Anderson 1998: 591) 
In this context, the author puts forward government support as one of the 
main proxies in which the citizen relies and additionally suggests the system 
support proxy and the establishment party support proxy. Regarding system 
support, Anderson argues that, as the EU is a set of institutions, attitudes toward 
European integration may reflect attitudes toward national political systems 
(Anderson 1998: 576). In that approach, the main point of focus is the tension in 
the relationship between the national level legitimacy and supranational political 
integration (Hoffman 1966, quoted in Martinotti et Stefanizzi 1995: 164). 
Although, in an early study, no straightforward relationship between satisfaction 
with democracy and support for integration has been found (ibid) and, according 
to Anderson, satisfaction with the performance of national democratic 
institutions is positively correlated with the level of support for European 
integration (1998). Another study which concentrates on the role of the 
democratic performance of the institutions on mass attitudes has been put 
forward by Rohrshneider (2002). Different from Anderson's national proxies' 
approach, the focus has been on the performance of the EU institutions. 
According to this approach, the citizens who live in countries with "high quality 
institutions" and good democratic performance, the democratic deficit of the EU 
and the feeling of not being represented in the EU leads to the dissatisfaction and 
lower level of support for European integration. Surely, the performance 
evaluation is not just limited to the democratic institutions. According to 
Sanchez Cuenca, trust in national institutions and problems such as corruption, 
high structural unemployment and poor performance of the state is also 
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influential in the attitudes toward supranational institutions and European 
integration (Sanchez Cuenca 2000). 
Proposition 2b: Positive levels of system satisfaction are related to 
higher support for EU integration. 
In terms of establishment party support proxy, Anderson first discusses 
the role of partisanship in classical left/right c1eavages and suggests that 
European integration is not an issue that can be represented on a left/right axis, 
but rather between establishment and anti-establishment parties (1998: 578-9). 
According to the author, by opposing European integration, the new and anti-
establishment parties prove that they are "real parties" and present themselves as 
an alternative to the "cartel" establishment parties (ibid: 579). From this 
perspective, the support for establishment or anti-establishment parties provides 
eues for the public in their attitudes toward European issues. Supporters of the 
anti-establishment parties are expected to be Jess supportive of European 
integration. The effects of left/right positioning on public attitudes toward 
European issues have been widely discussed in the literature (Wessels 1995, Hix 
2005, Van der Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis 1996). These studies fail to provide 
strong explanations regarding the relationship between left/right self-positioning 
and support for European integration (Anderson 1998). However, recent studies 
on the issue point out that, while the left/right ideological positioning has been 
significant on the national parties' reaction to European issues (Gabel and Hix 
2004, Hooghe and Marks 2004, Ray 2003b, Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004), the 
response of these party supporters varied according to the issue's importance of 
the party and individual's attachment to the party (Ray 2003b). Additionally, it 
has been argued that depending on the political-economic institutions of the 
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state, the leftfright positioning can have implications for public opinion (Brinegar 
et al. 2004, Marks 2004). 
c-) National identity: 
According to Tajfel's definition, the social identity is "part of an 
individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership 
to a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981: 255). Following this definition, 
Herman and Brewer propose that identification with a group "impels attachment 
loyalty and a sense of obligation to the group and group welfare" which in tum 
makes the social identification a potential resource for collective action (2004: 
6). In this context, the European and national identities emerge as important 
factors in the preferences of individuals (Hooghe and Marks 2004). 
The research on the identity Iiterature focuses mainly on the role of the 
national identity in the opposition toward further integration (see Jones and Van 
der Bijl 2004, Hooghe and Marks 2004). In the national identity strand, one of 
the main arguments emphasizes the effects of the national attachment on 
attitudes toward integration (Carey 2002, Taggart 1998). The study conducted by 
Carey shows that strong identity leads to lower levels of support for integration 
(2002). Carey defines the national identity as the "the intensity and the type of 
the relationship toward the nation" (Carey 2002: 391). The author relates the 
national identity to the individual's attachment to his/her nation and maintains 
that "the stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less 
Iikely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence 
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over economics and politics" resulting from the European integration (ibid). In 
other words, the conflicts over sovereignty and the fear from different identities 
and cultures influencing the national culture triggers an opposition to integration 
(2002:388). The studies conducted by Hooghe and Marks support the national 
identity propositions (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005). They find that individuals 
having exclusive national identity, i.e. individuals who see their national identity 
as "exclusive of other territorial identities," are more suspicious of European 
integration (Hooghe 2005: 424). Similarly, another study investigating attitudes 
toward immigration policy harmonization at the EU Ievel shows that national 
identity has a significant roIe in attitudes and suggests that those who are more 
strongly attached to the national identity are Iess likely to support harmonization 
policies at the European Union Ievel (Luedtke 2005). 
Proposition 3: Higher Ievels of exclusive nationality are related to lower 
support for EU integration. 
Another set of explanations implies that the perceived threat from other 
cultures is an essential determinant of public support for the European Union 
(McLaren 2002, De Master and Le Roy 2000). Both studies criticize the main 
assumption of self-interest in the rational calculation models of explaining public 
attitudes and emphasize the role of societal needs in attitude formation. 2 
According to De Master and Le Roy, who study the issue in the context of 
xenophobia, the fear of foreigners triggers opposition toward integration (2000). 
They argue that, as a result of the integration process, "the flow of peopIes across 
national borders and the influence of foreign policymakers on domestic politics, 
the perception of foreigners will likely have a greater effect on support" (2000: 
2 For a detailed analysis of self interest and societal interest see Funk 2000. 
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425). According to the authors, as the perceived threat on the integrity of the 
nation and fear of foreigners increase, citizens will be less likely to support the 
integration process (ibid: 421). From a different point of view, Hooghe and 
Marks claim that individuals with positive feelings toward cultural diversity are 
more supportive of integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004, Marks and Hooghe 
2003). 
Similarly, McLaren argues that attitudes toward the European Union are 
mainly based on general hostility toward other cultures (2002, 2003, 2006). She 
con tends that "the people are concerned about the problems related to the 
degradation of the nation state" (2002: 554) and the protection of the in-group 
(the nation). She also claims that the level of antipathy toward other cultures 
resulting from nationalistic attachments is a principal factor which determines 
public attitudes toward European integration (ibid: 551). McLaren refers to the 
literature on symbolic politics and realistic group conflicts and argues that as the 
level of perceived threat increases, the level of support for integration decreases 
(2002, 2006). In symbolic politics theory, the main assumption is that long 
standing predispositions based on early childhood influence the perceptions and 
attitudes, as weil as the responses to certain symools (Sears, Hensler and Speer 
1979: 371, Sears, Citrin, Cheleden and van Laar 1999). Symbolic threat, also 
called cultural threat, has been mainly referred to immigrant/majority intergroup 
relations and emphasizes the perceived threat on distinct morals, norms and 
values posed by immigrants and the negative feelings emerging in the ho st 
community (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald and Tur Kaspa 1998). In 
the European case, McLaren suggests that the European public reacts to 
integration in a symbolic way and it is likely to resist integrative policies which 
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pose a threat to a very important symbol, to the power and sovereignty of the 
nation state and cultural integrity (2002: 555, 2006: 73). 
Another strand in the political science literature on which McLaren bases 
her argumentation is the realistic group conflict theory. According to Blumer, the 
main argument of the theory is that "perceptions of members of groups other 
th an one's own receiving benefits at a cost to one's own group" leads to hostility 
between groups (BJumer quoted in Mclaren 2006: 50). Mclaren underlines the 
realistic group conflict theory as a factor in explaining public attitudes toward 
European integration and flnds that percei ved threat conceming redistribution of 
national resources and benefits to non nationals--especially to immigrant 
groups-by the inechanisms of EU institutions triggers the opposition toward 
integration (2006:68). In other words, the perceived threat or fear for the loss of 
national resources is presented as a significant-maybe not principal-
determinant of reluctance toward the integrative process. Similarly, research 
conducted among Swiss CÎtizens examining public attitudes toward European 
membership shows that the stronger the national identity and the perception of 
threat to national interests, the Jess likely they are to be favorable to a European 
Union membership (Christin and Trechsel 2002). Also, De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden argue that concems about the national identity are associated with 
perceptions of immigration as a threat to culture and the y put forward the anti-
immigration sentiments as the main factor of support for European Union 
integration (2005). 
Proposition 4: Higher levels of perceived threat from other cultures are 
related to lowe,r support of EU integration. 
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c- Determinants of public support for European enlargement 
European integration is a process which progresses by both geographical 
widening and institutional deepening. Most of the studies focusing on public 
attitudes in the European Union mainly concentrate on the deepening side of 
progress, while the widening, or in other words the enlargement of the EU, has 
been neglected. The vast majority of studies dealing with public opinion 
concerning the enlargement process has been conducted on candidate countries 
and focused on the attitudes toward the prospective membership to the EU 
(Grabbe and Hughes 1999, Ehin 2001). Recently, several studies have been 
published which assess the determinants of public support on European 
enlargement in member states. 
In one of these studies, Jones and Van der Bijl, in their national level 
analysis, examine the impacts on aggregate support for enlargement of factors 
such as level of transaction between countries, geographic proximity, as weil as 
the share of employment in the member and candidate states (2005). The authors 
find that while there is a positive correlation between the lev el of support and the 
trade amount between member and candidate states, the distance between 
capitals correlates negatively. Another important proposition in the study 
considers the relation between the size of agriculture in a candidate state and the 
public attitudes toward their accession in member states. The authors state that 
countries with large agricultural sector and with high employment in agriculture 
receive substantial financial subventions which are provided from relatively rich 
countries (page 345). In this context, they suggest that public support toward 
enlargement decreases in member states when the importance of agriculture in 
dom es tic employment increases in candidate states. 
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In a recent study, Hazama puts forward a constructive approach and 
claims that individuals who believe that enlargement would promote 
democratization of the acceding countries and the reunification of Europe tend to 
be more favorable toward the enlargement process (2007). De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden also consider the dynamics of public support for enlargement 
(2006). According to the authors, the media stand out as a strong power on the 
formation of public opinion among European citizens, especially on issues 
concerning the enlargement process. AIso, in another study which extends the 
propositions of McLaren regarding the hostility toward other cultures as a 
determinant of public support, they contend that anti-immigration sentiments 
play a significant role in the attitudes toward enlargement as well as in attitudes 
towards integration (2005). 
Nevertheless, research on support for EU enlargement remains few and 
limited. None of these studies pro vide a collective examination of all of the 
different theoretical perspectives presented in extensive integration literature. In 
other words, in the contemporary literature on public opinion what is frequently 
explored is support for European integration. We believe that the alternative 
theoretical perspectives proposed to understand support for the entire European 
integration project should be explored also in the case of the enlargement 
process, which is an essential part of the integration project. In order to do so, we 
will perform a more systematic examination of the determinants of support for 
EU enlargement. First, we will test ail the propositions that emerge from the 
literature on public support for integration presented above within the context of 
support for European enlargement. Second, we will present and test a novel 
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explanation. Both of these contributions are outlined in the two following sub-
sections. 
a-) Applying the factors of integration support to enlargement 
support: 
As stated in the previous sections, rational/economic calculation 
explanations play an important part in understanding public support for 
integration. The main argument in that perspective is that integrative policies 
pursued at the European level creates different costs and benefits to individuals 
depending on their socio- economic situation. Simply put, the effects of market 
Iiberalization for capital, goods and labor create different costs and benefits for 
individuals from different education backgrounds, occupational skills and 
income levels. This proposition applies also to the enlargement process because 
the elimination of barri ers "alters the balance of labor and capital across national 
markets" (Gabel 1998c: 938). The capital transfers to the low-wage countries, on 
one hand, and the migration from less developed member states, on the other 
hand, increase the competitiveness for unskilled jobs (ibid). Besides the 
socioeconomic factors, positive evaluation of the economic situations and 
positive future expectations may diminish the perception of threat from the 
accession of new countries. In that perspective, we will test the following 
hypotheses in the enlargement case. 
Hypothesis I(a): Lower levels of socioeconomic status are related to 
lower support for EU enlargement. 
Hypothesis I(b): Positive evaluations of economic conditions are related 
to higher support for EU enlargement. 
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Regarding the propositions in the domestic politics theoretical 
perspective, the main argument is that, given the low level of knowledge about 
European affairs, the popularity of the incumbent govemment which is 'in 
charge' of the European integration process influences the attitudes of citizens 
toward EU integration. Of course, to apply this perspective to the enlargement 
process holds sorne problems. Conceming integration, it is the govemments of 
the member states that participate in EU activities and decision making 
(Anderson 1998: 577); the govemments do not oppose explicitly to the 
integration project. However, for enlargement, particularly about the accession of 
Turkey, the opposition is reflected more explicitly. Still, the relationship between 
govemment support and public attitudes should be taken into consideration 
because despite the explicit opposition, Turkey has been accepted as a candidate 
and the opening of negotiation talks has been approved by the govemment 
leaders. Simply put, in spite of the rhetoric, in practice, the govemments seem to 
be in favor of Turkey's membership. The second domestic proposition that we 
will test in the case of enlargement is the system satisfaction proxy. In that 
perspective, the idea is that individuals with high level of trust for their domestic 
political institutions and high levels of satisfaction with the democratic system 
are more favorable to the integration process. As a result of enlargement, the 
representation of the new countries in European institutions and the changing 
balance in the decision-making processes certainly causes burdens on the 
working of European institutions. According to Anderson, the citizens of 
national states reflect their views about domestic institutions toward European 
institutions. In this framework, it can be expected that a higher Ievel of trust for 
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the domestic system would provide a higher levels of trust for the EU 
institutions, which decreases the opposition to enlargement. 
Hypothesis lI(a): Positive evaluations of the incumbent govemment are 
related to higher support for EU enlargement. 
Hypothesis lI(b): Positive levels of system satisfaction are related to 
higher support for EU enlargement. 
In the national identity strand, the role of national attachment and the 
feelings toward national identity and culture have been emphasized. The 
integration process indisputably results in the sharing of national sovereignty and 
the increasing interaction of different cultures. The enlargement process on one 
hand expands the number of states taking part in the EU decision-making 
processes and on the other hand, with the elimination of the borders within the 
EU, thereby it facilitates the movement of persons between borders. It would be 
accurate to expect that the individuals who are more attached to their national 
identity and more sensitive about national sovereignty are more suspicious about 
the enlargement process. Besides, the potential immigration from new member 
states affects the level of perceived threats to their culture and their economic 
resources. Departing from that point of view, we will examine the following 
hypotheses in the enlargement case. 
Hypothesis III: Higher levels of exclusive nationality are related to 
lower support for EU enlargement. 
Hypothesis IV: Higher levels of perceived threat from other cultures are 
related to lower support for EU enlargement. 
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Without li doubt, our approach shows important similarities between the 
views of McLaren and De Vreese et al., especially by emphasizing the role of 
intercultural relations and perceiving "other" cultures as a threat to the main 
stream society. However, in our study, we build up a different perspective to 
early propositions. Pirst of ail, white the anti-immigration sentiments proposition 
takes into consideration not only cultural factors but also economic factors3, we 
develop an approach that mainly concentrates on inter-cultural factors. 
Concerning the "perceived threat" approach of McLaren, we extend this 
approach and develop a different standpoint by focusing on the role of 
assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism on the attitudes toward 
enlargement. The role of multiculturalism is assessed by Hooghe and Marks in 
earlier studies discussing its effects on the integration process (2004). In this 
study, we present assimilationist expectations of the host society or the fear from 
"failure to assimilate" (Paxton and Mughan 2006) to the mainstream culture and 
multiculturalism as a determinant of public opinion for the European 
enlargement. We now look at that proposition in detail. 
3 The authors use a five-item index to measure anti-immigrant sentiment (1) immigration is good 
for the labor market; (2) immigrants cause problems in the schools that their children attend; (3) 
immigrants enrich Danish or Dutch culture; (4) members of immigration groups misusè Danish 
or Dutch social welfare; and (5) their religion is a threat to our way of living. (De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden 2005) 
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b-) A new perspective of identity: 
The attachment to national identity and attitudes toward "others" have 
emerged as a significant and developing approach in explaining European public 
attitudes toward integration. In this study, parallel with the views mentioned 
earlier on the national identity strand, we maintain that the attitudes of people 
toward "others" affect their opinion on enlargement. Simply put, we argue that 
multicultural or assimilationist expectations of majority group members from 
non-nationals are essential in understanding the level of their support for 
enlargement. 
Most western European societies, as a result of increasing migration, are 
tuming into multicultural societies. Accordingly, the incorporation of immigrants 
into the host society has been an important are a of study in the social sciences. 
However, most of the studies in that area mainly concentrated on strategies and 
policies developed by the states (Massey 1999, Ireland 2004, Casties and 
Davidson 2000, Brubaker 2002, Kastoryano 2002). Nevertheless, recently, there 
is an increasing interest which focuses on the intercultural relations between 
minority groups and majority groups in the ho st societies and on diverse 
adaptation strategies. In other words, the behavior of minority members on how 
to incorporate into the main society and the views of the host society on that 
matter has gained significance in intergroup relations. 
According to Berry who underlines the socio-psychological aspects of 
intercultural contact and acculturation processes, individuals and groups in 
multicultural societies face two important dimensions. The first dimension 
concems the maintenance and development of the original culture of the 
immigrants. The second dimension concerns the desirability of contact with the 
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members of the host society (Berry 1984, 1990, 2001). The term psychological 
acculturation, first proposed by Graves, accounts for the psychological changes 
experienced by individuals who are members of cultures in contact (cited in 
Berry 2001) and Berry proposes four distinct acculturation strategies according 
to the combination of these dimensions of contact and culture maintenance. As 
stated in the following table, different responses to culture maintenance and 
contact result in different acculturation attitudes such as assimilation, integration, 
separation and marginalization. 
Table 1. Models of Possible Acculturation Strategies 
Positive relations with 
majority group members 
Yes 
No 
Source: Adapted from Berry 1984 
Maintaining the original culture 
Yes No 
Integration Assimilation 
Separation Marginalization 
According to Berry, if the individuals do not wish to maintain their 
original culture and give importance to interaction with other cultures, the 
resulting acculturation attitude is assimilation. We speak of integration if the 
individuals wish to contact without loosing their original culture. Separation 
occurs when the individuals aim to maintain their culture but do not seek contact 
with other cultures. Finally, if there is no desire for interaction nor for protecting 
the original culture it results in marginalization (Berry 1984, 1990, 2001). 
There are an increasing number of studies which take into consideration 
the preferences of the minority groups as weil as of the majority groups 
concerning acculturation attitudes. The difference of opinion on that matter 
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affects mutual expectations as weIl as inter-cultural relations (Verkuyten and 
Thijs 2002, Taylor and Lambert 1996). Surely, this has been linked to an 
increasing number of studies which examine the expected acculturation 
strategies of the newcomers and the members of the ho st society (Zagefka and 
Brown 2002, Van Oundenhoven, Prins and Buunk 1998, Van Oundenhoven and 
Eisses 1998, Berry ] 984, ] 990, 200], Horenczyck 1996, Bourhis Moise, 
Perreault and Senecal 1997). The studies show that while the newcomers mostly 
aim for integration as the preferred acculturation strategy, host society members 
are more inclined toward assimilationist strategies (Van Oundenhoven et al. 
1998, Horenczyck ] 996). It should be noted that the rhetoric of integration has 
been appropriated by many majority groups and they are trying to attribute to 
their assimilationist acculturation strategy a more "liberal flavor" (Horenczyck 
1996: 248), the host society members are mostly protective in the maintenance of 
their culture and favor the assimilation as the acculturation strategy (Van 
Oundenhoven et al. 1998, Van Oundenhoven and Eisses ] 998, Horenczyck 
1996). In this perspective, we contend that the attitude in terms of acculturation 
strategies, in other words, whether the individuals possess an assimilationist or a 
multicultural approach toward others, is determinant on their attitudes formation 
in the case of European enlargement. The hypotheses can be stated this way: 
Hypothesis V(a): Higher levels of multicultural approach are related to 
higher support for EU enlargement. 
Hypothesis V(b): Higher levels of assimilationist approach are related to 
lower support for EU enlargement. 
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Conclusion 
This study aims to contribute to the literature in two are as. On the one 
hand, we test the main hypotheses put forward about public opinion concerning 
the integration process in the case of the enlargement process. On the other hand, 
we extend the propositions of the hostility toward other cultures as a determinant 
of public support by adding assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism as 
explanatory variables. In the next chapter, we will test these hypotheses 
regarding the determinants of European public support for EU enlargement in a 
comparative analysis of Turkey and Poland. 
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Chapter 11- European Public Opinion on enlargement: 
A Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Poland 
In this chapter, we conduct a multivariate analysis to test the hypotheses 
presented in the first chapter. The first section of the chapter provides a brief 
history of European enlargement with a focus on the fifth en largement of the EU 
toward Central and Eastern European Countries and Turkey's accession. In the 
following sections, we will present the data, the method and the results of the 
analysis examining the determinants of public support for the membership of 
Turkey and Pol and to the European Union. 
A-) A Brief History of European Enlargement 
The European Union was founded by six countries with the establishment 
of European Co al and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957. In less than 
fifty years, as a result of five successful enlargements, the number of member 
states has grown to 27. The fifth and last enlargement started with the accession 
of 10 new countries4 in the European Union in 2004 and comp1eted with the 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria in January 2007. This has been the largest 
enlargement of the European Union and, in a sense, it was a sign of the re-
unification of Europe divided by an Iron Curtain (EU Commission). Presently, 
Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia are the candidate countries for membership and 
western Balkan countries such as Albania, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and 
4 These 10 countries are: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Pol and, Slovakia and Slovenia 
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Montenegro can be counted among the potential candidate countries for 
membership. 
Until the end of the 1980s, the relationship between the European Union 
and Pol and has been limited. However, the initiation of the Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement in 1989 and the introduction of the PHARE program in 
the same year have been important steps in the development of closer relations 
between both parties. After the collapse of communist regimes in Europe in 
199], the Europe Agreements were signed with Pol and, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. The main purpose of the agreement was to create Ha special type of 
relationship reflecting geographic proximity, shared values and increased 
interdependence" (European Commission 1992, quoted in Gower 1999). 
Following the introduction of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993), which set the 
rules for membership on April 1994, Poland formally applied for EU 
membership and accession negotiations started in 1997. At that time, although 
there were no major problems on meeting the political criteria, Poland, with its 
size and population, was a major challenge for the European Union. However, it 
is commonly argued that the success of Poland' s full integration was crucial for a 
successful eastern enlargement (Podraza 2005: 31). On May 2004, Pol and joined 
the EU as a full member of the union. 
The history of relations between Turkey and EU is longer and surely 
more complicated than aIl precedent candidate countries. Since the establishment 
of the Turkish republic, transformation from an Oriental Islamic empire to a 
secular nation state, in other words Westernization, became the principal 
objective of the Turkish state and its elite (Joseph 2006:]). The idea behind the 
reforms-mainly top-to-bottom-has been the westernization of the new 
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republic, a republic established at the end of a war against Western powers. 
Turkey first applied to the European Economic Community for an association 
agreement in 1959. In 1964, the Ankara Agreement was signed between Turkey 
and the six members of the community. The aim of the Ankara Agreement was 
to establish economic integration, free movement of workers and doser ties 
between both parties. However, during the fol1owing years, the occurrence of 
events such as human rights violations, coups d'état and a deteriorating 
economic situation in Turkey became big burdens on the development of 
relations (LaGro and Jorgensen 2007: 5). Application for full membership in 
1987 was rejected, but still Turkey has been encouraged by the formation of the 
Custom Union which was approved in 1995. For Turkish officiaIs, the creation 
of the Custom Union has been perceived as an important step toward 
membership in the short term (Arikan 2006: 89). However, the decision, made 
during the European council meeting of December 1997, not to accept Turkey as 
a candidate state paved the way for the interruption of relations between Turkey 
and the EU. At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey was finally accepted as a 
candidate state. The accession negotiation could start six years later in 2005, 
after a series of reforms enacted by the govemment in political, social and 
economic areas. Presently, the negotiations between Turkey and EU continue 
very slowly alongside the discussions concerning "the place" of Turkey in 
Europe. 
In this study, we will test the hypotheses put forward In the cases of 
Poland and Turkey in a comparative perspective. Although our principal interest 
is on public opinion toward Turkey's accession, we will conduct a comparative 
analysis in order to observe alternative explanations and to reduce the magnitude 
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of measurement error (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 210). In a comparative 
study, it is crucial to choose the cases that possess similarities in many important 
characteristics as weil as dissimilarities (Lijphart 71: 687). Turkey and Poland 
hold significant similarities and differences which render a valid comparison. 
Referring to a study conducted by Onis (2004), the se similarities can be 
summarized as follows: elites in both countries give importance to being a part 
of Europe; both countries are large in population size; both have a large and 
inefficient agricultural sector which creates a burden on European institutions 
like the Common Agricultural policy and on structural and regional funds; both 
countries experienced a long period of state domination in their economic and 
political systems; and finally, both countries are in a reform process to 
consolidate the "substantive" democracy in their society but nevertheless did not 
establish the western standards of democracy (Onis 2004: 482-483). Regarding 
the differences between these two countries, the main distinction lies in cultural 
aspects. Poland, with its geographical proximity and its cultural and historical 
relations was an expected candidate for the European Union (ibid: 484). The 
inclusion of CEE countries to the union would be an historical step toward the 
end of the division of the continent and the reunification of Europe, which has 
been sought by the very idea of European integration (Wallace, Wallace and 
Pollack 2005: 407). On the contrary, there have always been and still are doubts 
and reluctance toward future membership of Turkey among the state elites as 
weil as among the public. Simply put, the accession process of Pol and to the EU 
signified and was perceived as the reunification of Europe, while the history, 
culture and the geographical situation of Turkey led to discussions concerning its 
"European identity" and its place in Europe. 
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B-) Data 
In this study, we assess the determinants of public opinion toward the 
accession of Turkey and Poland to the European Union. In this context, we test 
the hypotheses put forward in Iiterature about public support for European 
integration, and add assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism variables. 
To operationalize these variables, we use data from a Eurobarometer 
survey which was conducted in April-May 2000.5 There are two main reasons to 
choose this Eurobarometer survey. First, during the period the survey was being 
conducted, the negotiations between Pol and and the EU were still continuing and 
Turkey was recently recognized as a candidate for membership. Although the 
negotiation talks were not started yet in the case of Turkey, both countries had 
the status of candidate for membership which provides the opportunity for a 
better comparison. The second reason to choose that survey was mainly 
practical. Eurobarometer 53 is a very comprehensive survey which provides the 
opportunity to examine various theories. The survey was carried out in 15 
member states and a total of 16078 respondents were interviewed. 
The dependent variable, the support for accession, is operationalized 
using the survey question: "For each of the following countries, would you be in 
favor of or against it becoming part of the European Union?" The answers of the 
respondents were coded for each candidate and potential candidate country as "in 
favor," "against" and "DK." For our study, the dependent variable is 
operationalized as a dichotomous variable, coded as ] when the respondent is in 
favor of the accession and coded as 0 when the respondent is against or there is 
5 Eurobarometer 53 is obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR), the study number is 3064. 
44 
no answer. Coding the answer as a binary variable provides a larger sample size 
and, additionally, it makes it possible to distinguish the characteristics of 
supporters not only from the opponent but from the rest of the sample (Ehin 
200]: 43). The total number of respondents for the entire survey was 16078. 
Missing cases for Turkey were 17, while for Poland it was only 13. While only 
31 percent of respondents are in favor of Turkey's European Union membership, 
48 percent of the respondents are in favor of Poland's membership. The 
distribution of answers for both countries is shown in the following table. 
Table Il. Frequency Distribution: Support for European Union membership 
Support for Turkey's Membership Support for Poland's Membership 
Freq. % Valid% Cum.% Freq. % Valid% Cum.% 
Valid Against + DK 11005 68,45 68,52 68.52 8466 52,66 52,70 52.70 
ln Favor 5056 31.45 31.48 100.00 7599 47,26 47,30 100,00 
Total 16061 99,89 100,00 16065 99,92 100,00 
Missing System 17 0,11 13 0,08 
Total 16078 100,00 16078 100,00 
The independent variables have been operationalized under three groups. 
In the construction of the independent variables, we used the same measures as 
the studies that have been referred. The first group of independent variables in 
the analysis concerns the economie/rational ca1culations and inc1udes 
occupational skills, education levels, household income levels, and future 
economic expectations. For occupational skills, we created three dummy 
variables for manual workers, unemployed and professionals. The education 
variable is recoded under four categories according to the age that the 
respondents completed their education. It should be noted that European 
countries acquire a wide variety of educational structures. In the formation of 
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four education categories, we mainly referred to a report on education prepared 
by European Commission (2005) which provides data about the educational 
systems of each member state. The first category represent the respondents who 
stopped full time education at 15 years old which correspond to primary and 
lower secondary education. The respondents who had upper secondary education 
have been grouped under the second category. The respondents who participated 
in post secondary schools lasting 6 months to 2 years which prepares them for 
labor market and tertiary education (ibid. 63) listed in the third category. Finally, 
the forth category corresponds to the 21 years old and more includes the 
university degree and more. In the analysis, the average age that respondents 
stopped full time education is 17.8 years (excludes still studying respondents) 
The respondents that are still studying were classified by their age. The income 
level variable is recoded in a four point scale regarding the respondents' self-
evaluations.6 And finally, the future economic expectations variable is 
operationalized using the question: "In the course of the next five years, do you 
expect your personal situation to improve, to stay about the· same or to get 
worse?" The answers are coded as 0 (Get Worse), 0.5 (Stay about the same) or] 
(Improve). The "do not know" answers are recoded with the "stay about the 
same" answers 
In the second group, the independent variables concem the domestic 
politics and they have been assessed as left/right self replacement, satisfaction 
with the incumbent government, and satisfaction with the system. Left right 
ideology is measured according the self-placement of the respondents, ranging 
from 1 (left) to 10 (right). In order to measure the satisfaction with the incumbent 
6 The DK answers are recoded to the median. 
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govemment, the question "If there were a 'General Election' tomorrow which 
party would you vote for?" is used. Those who affirm that the y would vote for 
the existing govemment party or parties are coded as 1 and an the others are 
coded O. Finally, the responses for the question about whether respondents are 
satisfied with how the democracy works in their country, is coded as 0 (Not At 
ail Satisfied), 0.33 (Not very Satisfied), 0.67 (Fairly Satisfied) or 1 (Very 
Satisfied). The "do not know" answers are placed at the median. 
In the national identity strand, the independent variables have been 
identified as the exclusive national identity and the perceived threat from other 
cultures. The exclusive national identity variable is operationalized according to 
respondent's answers to the question about whether they define themselves as 
nationality only, European only or both. The nationality only answer has been 
recoded as 1 and the rest has been recoded as O. The perceived threat from other 
groups is explored under symbolic threat and realistic threat. The variables are 
measured by the responses to two statements: "People from these minority 
groups abuse the system of social benefits" and "The religious practices of 
people from these minority groups threaten our way of life." Those who agree 
with those statements are recoded as 1 and those who disagree are recoded as O. 
In the analysis, the "do not know" answers have been placed at the median 
category. This method has been chosen instead of list-wise deletion of cases in 
order to not lose these data.? 
Finally, the assimilationist expectations have been operationalized using 
the following survey question: "In order to be fully accepted members of 
7 Carey uses the same method to handle the 'do not know' missing values. She suggests that the 
results from two different analysis one with listwise-deleted "don't knows" and one with ail 
"don't knows" recoded in the 'neither good nor bad' category, are both very similar. (2002: 394) 
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(NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to minority groups must give up 
their own culture." The answers of this question provide a strong indication 
about the views of the respondents concerning assimilation. The possible 
answers in the codebook were "tend to agree," "tend to disagree," and "OK." 
The answers have been recoded into a three point scale ranging from 0 to ], 
where 0 signifies "tend to disagree," and 1 "tend to agree". The OK answers 
have been recoded at the median. In order to assess multicultural attitudes, we 
used this survey question: "It is a good thing for any society to be made up of 
people from different races, religions or cultures." The answers of the 
respondents have been recoded the same way as the assimilationist expectations 
variable where 0 signifies "tend to disagree" and 1 signifies "tend to agree." For 
details concerning the construction and descriptive statistics of the independent 
variables, see Appendix A. 
C) - Method 
In the empirical analysis, we use logistic regression to test the 
hypotheses. Logistic regression models are mainly used when the dependent 
variable is binary or dichotomous (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Independent 
variables can be both continuous and discrete. Logistic regression analysis 
observes the odds of occurrence of an event and the effects of independent 
variables on these odds (O'Connell 2006:]]). Before running the logistic 
regression, the problem of multicollinearity should be taken into consideration. 
Unlike OLS regression, in a logistic regression there are no limitations for 
multivariate normality, homoscedasticity or linearity of the independent 
variables, still, the problem of multicollinearity should be controlled in a logistic 
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regression analysis (Spicer 2005: 135). The inter-correlated independent 
variables are called "multicollinear" and a problem of multicollinearity occurs in 
case these correlations have effects on the estimation of regression (von Eye and 
Schuster 1998: 134). No doubt, in our study, there are relatively highly correlated 
variables such as education and income level (r= 0.22) or perceived symbolic 
threat and assimilationist expectation (r=0.35) which show moderate 
correlations. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is an indicator that assesses the 
multicollinearity and a VIF greater than 10 points to problems which may cause 
inflation in the magnitude of estimates and standard errors (DeMaris 2004: 267-
268). The table in Appendix B shows that VIF values are low which confirms 
that there is not a multicollinearity problem. 
To investigate the effects of independent variables on the attitudes toward 
accession of both countries, we ran five logistic models for each country. Table 
III shows the results of the logistic regression analysis for Turkey and Poland. In 
the first three models, we investigated the economic/rational, domestic politics 
and national identity variables separately. The fourth model includes all the 
independent variables put forward in the literature. Finally, the fifth model 
includes ail the variables including assimilationist expectations and multicultural 
approaches. In the tables, we presented the logis tic regression coefficient and 
odds ratio value for each variable. The odds ratio indicates the "multiplicative 
impact on the odds of {occurrence of] an event for a unit increase" in the 
independent variable (ibid: 264). The odds ratio is a useful and simple way to 
evaluate the strength of the effects of independent variables on dependent 
variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). In the interpretation of results, our 
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main focus will be on the odds ratios. The traditional significance level of 0.05 is 
adopted. 
D)- Analysis 
The three models presented in Table III study separately the major individual 
level hypotheses on public support for enlargement. Model 1 regresses the socio-
economic variables on support for accession of Turkey and Poland. The results 
show that better economic evaluations and future expectations have strong 
effects on the odds of support for both countries. The odds ratio is higher for 
Turkey and the results demonstrate that respondents with better future 
expectations are 1.7 times more likely to support Turkey's accession (Poland 
1.33). Regarding the effects of socioeconomic status on public support, only 
income level reveals a significant effect in both cases. For both Turkey and 
Pol and, there is a positive relation between income level and support for 
accession (the odds ratios are 1.33 and 1.20, respectively). For the occupation 
ski Ils, the results provide little evidence about their effects on public attitudes. In 
the Polish case, only the manu al worker variable is significant, indicating that 
manu al workers are less supportive of accession. When we take the education 
variable into account, the results yield mixed effects that differ by country. The 
proposition that a higher educational level is positively related to support for 
enlargement is validated in the Polish case. According to the results, respondents 
with a higher education level are 1.87 times more likely to support Poland's 
membership. In the Turkish case, the results for the education variable are not 
statically significant. 
Model II reveals the effects of domestic poli tics variables on the support 
for accession. Consistent with the Hypothesis II(b), respondents who have a 
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Table III. Results from logistic regression analysis predicting support for accession 
Turkey Pol and 
Modell Model2 Model3 Modell Mode 1 2 Model3 
B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) Exp(B) 
Economie 
Education Level 0,042 (0,048) \,043 0,625** (0,045) 1,868 
Income Level 0,182** (0,055) 1,200 0,285** (0,052) 1,331 
Professional 0,019 (0,075) 1,019 0,099 (0,072) 1,105 
Manual worker 0,002 (0,040) 1,003 -0,093* (0,038) 0,911 
Unemployed 0,041 (0,074) 1,042 -0,047 (0,069) 0,954 
Future Expectations 0,529** (0,056) 1,698 0,282** (0,052) 1,325 
Domest;c 
Ideology Left/Righl -0,350**(0,087) 0,705 -0,206* (0,081) 0,814 
System Satisfaction 0,735** (0,069) 2,086 0,720** (0,064) 2,054 
Incumbent Support 0,083* (0,038) 1,087 0,007 (0,036) 1,007 
Nationalldentity 
Exclusive National 
-0,382**(0,036) 0,682 -0,577**(0,033) 0,562 Identity 
Realîstic Threat -0,371 **(0,040) 0,690 -0,339**(0,038) 0,712 
Symbolic Threat -0,364**(0,043) 0,695 -0,299**(0,039) 0,741 
N 16045 16045 16045 16049 16048 16050 
-2 LogL 19876,691 19842,152 19578,403 21840.135 22060,051 21590,632 
chi-square 114,933 149,472 411,666 362,074 140,662 613,075 
** p < 0,00] ; * p < 0,05. The results were obtained using SPSS 
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higher level of trust for their domestic institutions and who are satisfied with the 
performance of the democratic institutions are more likely to support the 
accession of Turkey and Poland. In both cases, one unit increase of system 
satisfaction increases the likelihood of being in favor of enlargement more than 
twice. Leftlright ideology also appears to be a significant factor in the attitudes 
toward enlargement. The results suggest that respondents who find themselves 
cJoser to the right are more reluctant toward the accession of new countries. 
Final/y, in terms of incumbent support, the findings are statistical/y significant in 
the Turkish case (p<0.05). The results point to a positive relationship between 
incumbent govemment support and support for accession as expected, however it 
does not show a strong effect. The supporters of govemment are only 9% more 
likely to be in favor of Turkey' s membership. 
The variables associated with national identity have been analyzed 
separately in Model III. The results display strong negative effects of national 
identity on public support. Consistent with Hypothesis III, having an exclusive 
national identity emerges as a strong predictor of attitudes toward accession, 
especially in the Polish case. Respondents defining themselves only with their 
nationality and having a strong attachment to their national identity are almost 
half less likely (0.56) to support the membership of Poland. Likewise, in the 
Turkish case, the results indicate that a one unit increase in exclusive national 
identity reduces the likelihood of supporting Turkey's membership by 32 
percentage points (1-0.68= 0.32). The results for realistic and symbolic threat 
/end support to Hypothesis IV, which points to the negative effects of perceived 
threat on support for accession. The coefficient and odds ratio values have strong 
negative effects in both cases. Respondents who perceive threat on their 
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economic resources are less likely to support the accession of Poland and Turkey 
to the EU. A one unit increase on the level of perceived realistic threat reduces 
the likelihood to be in favor of the membership of Poland and Turkey by 30% 
(Poland (1-0.71) = 0.29; Turkey (1-0.69) = 0.31). For both cases, the perceived 
threat on culture was found to play an important role on attitudes. Perceiving 
threat on culture decreases the odds of support, but it should be noted that in the 
Turkish case perceived symbolic threat has a greater negative effect on support 
than in the Polish case. The magnitudes of regression coefficients are 
respectively -0,36 and -0,30 and both are significant at p< 0.001. Therefore, the 
increasing level of perceived threat on economic sources and on culture results in 
an increasing reluctance toward the EU membership of Turkey and Pol and which 
confirms the Hypothesis IV in the separate mode\. 
Table IV displays the logistic regression results for two different models. 
In Model 4, ail economie/rational calculations, domestic poli tics and national 
identity variables are inc1uded simultaneously in the analysis. This model 
provides us with the possibility to test the main hypotheses put forward in 
Integration literature. In the economie/rational calculation strand, the results for 
socio-economic variables show diverse results for both cases. In the Polish case, 
education and income are statistically significant and have positive effects on the 
likelihood of support for Poland's membership. Education appears to be an 
especially significant factor in attitudes toward the accession of Poland. 
Respondents with a one unit higher educational lèvel are ] .58 times more 
supportive Poland's membership. Surprisingly, for Turkey, education reveals a 
negative effect for support. The resuIts suggest that highly educated respondents 
are less favorable of Turkey's membership. In terms of occupation al skills, being 
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unemployed or working as a professional or manual worker do not have any 
significant effect in either cases. The future expectations variable appears to be a 
significant variable for both cases. The results point to increasing public support 
when they are more optimistic about their economic future. Particularly in the 
Turkish case, the future expectations show a very strong effect. Respondents 
with better expectations are 43% more likely to be in favor of Turkish 
membership (1] % for Poland). 
For domestic poli tics variables, the system satisfaction variable has very 
strong effects and high odds ratio values for both cases. Higher system 
satisfaction increases the predicted probability of support for Turkey's 
Table IV. Overall Models. Results from logistic regression estimates predicting 
support for accession. 
Turkey Poland 
Model4 Model5 Model4 Model5 
B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) Exp(B) B (S.E) 
Economic 
Education Level -0,130* (0,050) 0,878 -0,177** (0,050) 0,838 0,459** (0,046) 1,582 0,418** (0,047) 
Income Level 0,106 (0,056) 1,112 0,100 (0,056) 1,106 0,202** (0,052) 1,224 0,197** (0,053) 
Professional -0,007 (0,077) 0,993 -0,011 (0,077) 0,988 0,074 (0,073) 1,077 0,065 (0,074) 
Manual worker 0,045 (0,042) 1,046 0,041 (0,042) 1,042 -0,051 (0,039) 0,950 -0,054 (0,039) 
Unemployed 0,115 (0,075) 1,122 0,115 (0,076) 1,122 0,029 (0,070) 1,029 0,025 (0,071) 
Future Expectations 0,360** (0,058) 1,434 0,307** (0,058) 1,359 0,107* (0,053) 1,113 0,051* (0,054) 
Domestic 
Ideology Left/Right -0,151 (0,089) 0,859 -0,061 (0,090) 0,940 -0,046 (0,083) 0,955 0,048 (0,084) 
System Satisfaction 0,522** (0,071) 1,686 0,472** (0,072) 1,603 0,450** (0,066) 1,569 0,397** (0,067) 
1ncumbent Support 0,095* (0,039) l,10O 0,098* (0,039) 1,103 0,Q30 (0,036) 1,031 0,Q35 (0,037) 
Nationalldentity 
Exclusive National 
-0,343** (0,037) 0,710 -0,272** (0,037) 0,762 -0,473** (0,033) 0,623 -0,404** (0,034) Identity 
Realistic Threat -0,339** (0,040) 0,713 -0,257** (0,041) 0,773 -0,280** (0,038) 0,756 -0,196** (0,Q39) 
Symbolic Threat -0,334** (0,044) 0,716 -0,171 ** (0,046) 0,842 -0,250** (0,040) 0,779 -0,082* (0,042) 
Multiculturalism 0,550** (0,048) 1,734 0,503** (0,043) 
Assimilationist Exp. -0,172** (0,048) 0,842 -0,205** (0,043) 
N 16014 16004 16018 16008 
-2 Log L 19417,577 19239,668 21333,250 21135,065 
chi-square 539,714 706,947 826,860 1011,367 
** p < 0,001; * p < 0,05. The results were obtained usmg SPSS 
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Exp(B) 
1,519 
1,218 
1,067 
0,947 
1,025 
1,052 
1,049 
1,487 
1,035 
0,668 
0,822 
0,921 
1,655 
0,815 
membership by 69% (Poland: 57%). Conceming political ideology, though we 
find that moving from left to right ideologically fumishes a negative effect on the 
likelihood of support, the results are not statistically significant. AIso, the 
incumbent govemment support variable is significant only in the Turkish case, 
but suggests a small effect on the likelihood of support. As in the separate model, 
the national identity variable shows significant results in the overall model. In 
both cases, respondents having strong feelings toward their national identity and 
higher levels of perceived realistic and symbolic threat are less enthusiastic for 
the European enlargement. 
In the last model, Model 5, we added assimilationist expectations and 
multiculturalism variables to the analysis. First, in order to see if adding these 
variables to the equation contributes to the model or not, we are looking for the 
change in the -2 Log Likelihood values. The -2 Log Likelihood test which reflect 
the significance of the variance in the dependent variable is used for assessing 
the significance of the added variables (Romer 2006: 140). Compared with 
Model 4, the magnitude of the -2 Log likelihood significantly decreases which 
indicates that adding assimilationist expectations and multiculturalism variables 
contribute to the explanation in both cases (Spicer 2005: 129). Overall, the 
model performs weIl. The model is successful in predicting support for Turkey 
(68 % predicted correctly) and Poland (60% predicted correctly). Especially in 
the Polish case, the proposed model showed an improvement of 8 points over the 
model predictions. 
The results of logistic regressions confirm the hypothesis that higher 
levels of pluralist approach toward "other" leads to increasing support for 
enlargement (Hypothesis V(a». As shown in the table, respondents with 
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multicultural attitudes are 1.7 times more likely to support Turkey's membership 
to the European Union (1.65 for Pol and). OveraIl, the multicultural approach 
variable appears to have the strongest effect on the public support for the 
accession of Turkey. In the analysis, we also find support for the assimilationist 
expectations hypothesis (Hypothesis V (b)). The results are statistically 
significant in both cases. Though it has a relatively weaker impact on public 
attitudes than the multiculturalism variable, still the findings indicate that 
assimilationist expectation is a significant predictor of reluctance toward 
enlargement. The results confirm our proposition which highlights the role 
attitudes towards minority groups as a determinant of public opinion on 
enlargement issues. An important point that should be stated is that the results 
for the assimilationist expectation variable show stronger effects on dependent 
variables than the symbolic threat variable which also emphasizes cultural 
concems. 
* * * 
To summarize, the regression analysis of aIl variables from different 
theoretical perspectives sheds light on important findings. First of aIl, the results 
present limited support for Hypothesis I(a), which underlines the role of 
individual competitiveness and socioeconomic situations on public attitudes. 
Highly educated respondents seem to be only more supportive of the accession 
of Poland. In the Turkish case, we obtain opposite findings. The results do not 
show any significant effect for occupational ski Ils. Regarding future 
expectations, the results confirm Hypothesis I(b) in both cases, while the effect 
of the variable is stronger for Turkey. For the domestic poli tics hypotheses, we 
find strong support for Hypothesis II(b) which underlines the positive impact of 
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system satisfaction on public support. Finally, the variables in the national 
identity strand demonstrate strong effects on public support for the accession of 
Turkey and Poland. The results confirm Hypothesis III about the negative effects 
of having strong national identity and attachment. The logistic regression results 
also confirm Hypothesis IV suggesting that support for enlargement is negatively 
affected by the perceived threat on economic resources and on culture. Finally, 
the results display strong support for our own hypotheses. While respondents 
with multicultural attitudes are more enthusiastic for the accession of new 
countries to the EU, respondents with assimilationist expectations are less likely 
to support the enlargement. 
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Conclusion 
The European integration is mostly referred to as an elite-driven process. 
However, with coming into force of the Single European Act, the European 
Union became more salient in citizens' lives, which paved the way to increasing 
public involvement in the integration process. There is a growing Iiterature on 
public support for European integration which revolves around three main sets of 
explanations: economie/rational calculations, domestie poli tics and national 
identity. Nevertheless, these studies have mainly concentrated on support of the 
integration process; the enlargement issue is mostly neglected. In the case of 
Turkey, the data from member states' public surveys show strong reluctance 
toward the accession of Turkey. In front of increasing public opposition, sorne 
states such as France and Austria declared that the membership of Turkey will be 
taken to a referendum. From this perspective, we believe that it is important to 
investigate, in detail, the individual level determinants of public attitudes toward 
enlargement. 
The findings from the logistic regression analysis provide partial 
evidence for the effects of the economic calculations on support for enlargement. 
Socioeconomie variables have mixed effects in both cases. In the Polish case, 
respondents with more education and a higher income level are more likely to be 
in favor of possible enJargement. As suggested by Gabel, this might be because 
they feel less threatened by the accession of new countries (1995, 1998a, 1998b, 
1998c). However, the findings in the Turkish case are noteworthy. Surprisingly, 
we found opposite results which indicate that respondents with a higher 
education are Jess supporti ve of the accession of Turkey. The resuIts show strong 
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negative effects that can't be neglected. A possible explanation of these negative 
effects can be found in non-economic factors. Although the educationallevel has 
positive effects on economic security, it also increases the level of political 
awareness (Inglehart ] 970a, Bartle 2000) which, in tum, may result in 
questioning the membership of a country that has many conflicted issues such as 
human rights violations, the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish question and the 
Armenian genocide/massacre debates. 
Income level shows a positive association with support for enlargement; 
however results are significant only in the Polish case which requires further 
examination. In separate model, income level appears as a significant factor 
which has a positive effect on the likelihood of support for accession for both 
countries. However, in overall models shown in Table IV, it is evident that 
income level variable loses its effect and significance in Turkish case when 
controlling for national identity and domestic politics variables. Considering the 
effects of national identity variables, examining the effects of symbolic and 
realistic threat variable would be useful. As stated in the first part of the study, 
realistic threat corresponds to the perception of threat on social welfare benefits 
which may occur by opening the borders to new member state citizens. 
However, to explain the change on the income variable by the effects of realistic 
threat seems inadequate because we would see similar changes on the effects of 
income level for both Turkey and Poland. In this perspective, the effectsof 
cultural factors and the perceived threat on cultural symbols should be explored 
in more detail. Although Turkey and Pol and have big similarities in their size of 
population, economic structure and democratization process, they possess big 
differences in their historical relation with Europe and their cultural identity. In 
59 
this context, it would be accurate to suggest that the respondents in the analysis 
perceive more threat in their way of Iife and their cultural symbols in Turkish 
case regardless of their income level. 
One of the indisputable consequences of the enlargement process is the 
elimination of the barri ers to the movement of capital and persons. The free 
movement of capital gives rise either to the transfer of capital to low-cost labor 
countries or to the migration of labor from relatively Jess developed economies 
to the deveJoped economies which increase competition for jobs (Gabel 1998c). 
In su ch a context, it is expected that unskilled workers or unemployed persons be 
Jess supporti ve of the accession of new countries (Gabel 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 
1998c). However, our results do not provide any evidence regarding the effects 
of occupational skills. When we take into account the effects of economic 
evaluations on support for European enlargement, we find significant resuIts. 
Our findings offer strong evidence for the proposition,~llt rational calculations 
about the benefits of European integration and positive economic expectations 
do affect the JeveJ of support for enlargement. 
In the domestic political factors, satisfaction with the system and with the 
performance of democratic institutions stands out as a very strong predictor of 
support for enlargement. As stated by Anderson, because of their - limited 
knowledge of European institutions, citizens use proxies from domestic politics 
to evaluate the EU and if they are satisfied with the working of the domestic 
institutions, they are also satisfied with the European institution (1998). Wh en 
we take system satisfaction into account in the enlargement case, it would be 
accurate to say that trust of the domestic politics increases the trust for European 
institutions, which diminishes concerns about enJarging the union. The results 
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provides evidence for that proposition. The results offer little evidence for the 
govemment support hypothesis, which illustrates the relationship between 
support for incumbent govemment and support for enlargement. 
In one of their studies, Hooghe and Marks ask in the title if identity or 
economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration (2004). 
Asking the same question for the enlargement process, our findings provide a 
clear answer to that question. Our results confirm the significant role of national 
identity factors in determining public attitudes and show that this line of 
argumentation is more successful in explaining opinions toward enlargement. 
There is remarkably strong evidence for the negative effects of strong attachment 
to national identity. Conceming the national identity attachment, individuals who 
define themselves exclusively with their national identity instead of multiple 
identities are more protective about their identity. It can be said that the fear of 
loosing the principal underpinnings of their identity in front of the European 
identity, which diversifies by the accession of new countries, increases 
opposition toward enlargement. Interestingly, the effects of exclusive national 
identity are stronger in the Polish case, which has closer historical ties with 
Europe. Regarding perceived realistic and symbolic threat, the findings concur 
with our expectations. The perception of threat leads to a lowerlevel of support. 
However, the data on the perception of symbolic threat should be discussed in 
more detail. This variable has a stronger effect in the Turkish case than in the 
Polish case. This difference implies that in the Turkish case the respondents are 
more sensitive to the perceived threat to their culture. 
This brings to mind the question of whether religious differences have an 
effect on the threat perception. Nelsen et al. examine the role of religion on the 
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public and suggest that religious affiliations and religious commitment affect 
attitudes toward European integration (Nelsen, Guth and Fraser 2001). For 
instance, according to the authors, Roman Catholics are more supportive of the 
integration project (ibid: 210). An important sentence from the study states that 
even if Turkey manages to overcome its economic problems, the membership of 
a Muslim country to the European Union will be met with a lack of enthusiasm 
(ibid: 211). Unfortunately, the discussions about the roIe of religion on public 
support point out a shortcoming of this study. As the Eurobarometer does not 
include a question conceming the beliefs of the respondent, it is not possible to 
observe individual level effects of religious affiliations on public support for 
enlargement. Considering the Muslim population living in European countries, 
the role of religious affiliations on public opinion is a very important issue that 
requires further research. 
As stated in the previous sections, one of the objectives of this study is to 
test the propositions put forward in the literature on public support for 
integration in the enlargement case. Our findings reveal that national identity 
propositions are more successful in predicting public support. The second 
objective of the study is to assess the role of the multicultural approach and 
assimilationist expectations. For both cases, multiculturalism has the strongest 
effect on public support. It appears that positive feelings toward cultural 
diversity are critical for being in favor of the enlargement process. The 
individuals who perceive the existence of different cultures in their society as an 
opportunity to establish a culturally richer community support the accession of 
different countries to the EU. 
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In contrast, expectations from other cultures to give up their own culture 
to adapt to the society, in other words assimilationist expectations, create 
negative feelings towards enlargement. It is possible to read these results as a 
reaction to multiculturalism. For a long time, in Western European societies, to 
criticize multiculturalism and multicultural policies has been equated with 
racism, but today there are more criticism about the subject (Sniderman and 
Hagendoorn 2007: 123). The main idea behind multiculturalism is to protect the 
distinctive culture and identity of minority groups and to institute a society in 
which both minority and majority groups are "equal in standing" (ibid: 124-125). 
However, there is an increase among the people who see multiculturalism as a 
threat to their cultural core and their way of life (Auster 1990, Sniderman and 
Hagendoorn 2007). Our findings reveal that individuals who favor cultural 
assimilation to cultural diversity are less likely to support EU enlargement. 
In conclusion, the European integration project is formed as a unit y of 
states. However, it can be said that the European Union is evolving from a unit y 
of states toward a unit y of people. In this, perspective, we believe that the 
protection of national identity and inter-cultural relations are important factors 
that should be taken into consideration to better understand European integration 
and enlargement. Our results provide strong evidence for that perspective. 
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Appendix A 
Table V. Description of variables 
Variables 
Support for the 
TurkeylPoland's 
membership (DV) 
Economic Calculations 
Domestic Politics 
Nationalldentity 
Perceived Threats 
Education level 
Occupational Skills 
Income level 
Future Expectations 
LefURight 
Evaluation of Incumbent 
Satisfaction with the System 
Exclusive National Identity 
Realistic threat 
Symbolic threat 
Assimilationist expectations 
Multiculturalism 
Question 
For each of the following countries, would you be in 
favor of or against it becoming part of the European 
Union? Turkey (Q37.15), Pol and (Q37.3) 
How old were you when you stopped full-time 
education? (0.8) 
What is your CUITent occupation? (0.15) Dummy 
variables for professionals, manuallabors, 
unemployed (Gabel 1998b) 
Household Income (0.29) 
ln the course of the next five years, do you expect 
your personal situation to improve, to stay about the 
same or to get worse? (Q.6) 
ln political matters people talk of "the left" and "the 
right". How would you place your views on this 
scale? (0.1) 
If there were a "General Election" tomorrow which 
party would you vote for? (DA) 
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, 
not very satisfied or not at ail satisfied with the way 
democracy works in (Our country)? (Q.17) 
ln the near future do you see yourself as? (Q.28) 
Nationality only! Nationality and European! 
European and Nationality!European only 
People from these minority groups abuse the system 
of social benefits (Q51.3) 
The religious practices of people from these 
minority groups threaten our way of life (Q51.7) 
(McLauren 2002). 
ln order to be fully accepted members of the society, 
people belonging to minority groups must give up 
their own culture (Q59A) 
It is a good thing for any society to be made up of 
people from different races, religions or cultures 
(Q59.1) 
Coding 
O=Against + OK 
I=In Favor 
0=0-15 Years 
0.33=16-18 Years 
0.67=19-20 Years 
1=21> Years 
1 =ProfessionalfManager 
I=Manual Worker 
I=Unemployed 
O=Rest 
.00= --
.33= -
.50=No Response (OK) 
.67=+ 
1.00=++ 
.00=Get Worse 
.50=Stay about the same+ 
OK 1.00=lmprove 
.00=Left 
.50=DK 
1.00=Right 
O=Rest 
I=Vote for the party in 
government 
O=Not At ail Satisfied 
.33=Not very Satisfied 
.50=DK 
.67=Fairly Satisfied 
I=Very Satisfied 
O=EIse 
I=Nationality only 
.00=Disagree 
.50=DK 
1.00=Agree 
.00=Disagree 
.50=DK 
1.00=Agree 
.00=Disagree 
.50=DK 
1.00=Agree 
.00=Disagree 
.50=DK 
1.00=Agree 
7] 
T bl VI D f d d d' d d . bl a e . escnptlve statIstlcs or epen ent an ln epen ent vana es 
N Minimum ~m Mean Std. Deviation 
Support for Turkey' s membership 16061,00 0,00 1,00 0,31 0,46 
Support for Poland's membership 16065,00 0,00 1,00 0,47 0,50 
Education Ievel 16066,00 0,00 1,00 0,44 0,37 
Income Level 16078,00 0,00 1,00 0,49 0,32 
Professional 16078,00 0,00 1,00 0,06 0,23 
Manual worker 16078,00 0,00 1,00 0,24 0,43 
Unemployed 16078,00 0,00 1,00 0,06 0,23 
Future Expectations 16074,00 0,00 1,00 0.67 0,31 
Ideology LeftJRight 16078,00 0,00 1,00 0,48 0,20 
System Satisfaction 16060,00 0,00 1,00 0,54 0,25 
Incumbent Support 16078,00 0,00 1,00 0.29 0,45 
Exclusive National Identity 16078,00 0,00 1,00 0,44 0,50 
Realistic Threat 16064,00 0,00 1,00 0,60 0,45 
Symbolic Threat 16071,00 0,00 1,00 0,32 0,44 
Multiculturalism 16070,00 0,00 1,00 0,69 0,43 
Assimilationist Expectations 16067,00 0,00 1,00 0,29 0,42 
VaUd N (listwise) 16001,00 
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Table VII- Collinearity statistics 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Education level 0,870 1,150 
Income Level 0.915 1,093 
Professional 0,928 1,078 
Manual worker 0,942 1,062 
Unemployed 0,958 1,044 
Future Expectations 0,936 1,069 
Ideology Left/Right 0,940 1,064 
System Satisfaction 0,937 1,067 
Incumbent Support 0,951 1,051 
Exclusive National Identity 0,892 1,121 
Realistic Threat 0,852 1,174 
Symbolic Threat 0,782 1,279 
Multiculturalism 0,821 1,217 
Assimilationist Expectations 0,803 1,246 
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